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This paper studies the effect of landownership concentration on school 
enrollment for nineteenth-century Prussia. Prussia is an interesting laboratory 
given its decentralized educational system and the presence of heterogeneous 
agricultural institutions. We find that landownership concentration, a proxy for 
the institution of serf labor, has a negative effect on schooling. This effect 
diminishes substantially in the second half of the century. Causality of this 
relationship is confirmed by introducing soil-texture to identify exogenous farm 
size variation. Panel estimates further rule out unobserved heterogeneity. We 
argue that serfdom hampered peasants’ demand for education whereas the 
successive emancipation triggered a demand thereof. 
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An expanding literature investigates the eects of dierent historical institutions on
current economic outcomes (Engerman and Sokolo, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002). Places which developed extractive institutions are generally characterized
by the concentration of political power in the hands of a small elite and by a vast
majority of population without eective rights or protection. Cross-country stud-
ies show that those regions tended to stagnate in terms of economic growth. On
the contrary, areas with more democratic institutions took advantage of economic
opportunities and were more conducive to economic growth (Engerman et al., 2002).
As formalized in the theoretical model of Galor et al. (2009), an unequal distri-
bution of land among the population might delay the implementation of educational
institutions and indirectly aect growth. The delay in the expansion of formal ed-
ucation is caused by large landowners who oppose educational reforms to reduce
the mobility of the rural labor force. Similarly, Engerman and Sokolo (1997) and
Sokolo and Engerman (2000) suggest that the elite in Latin America opposed
democracy and mass investment in human capital because they were afraid of the
poor majority gaining power.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between landownership concentration|
a proxy for the extractive institution of serf labor|and the expansion of education
in nineteenth-century Prussia. We construct a unique dataset spanning the whole
nineteenth-century which includes, among other variables, primary school enroll-
ment rates and the distribution of landownership by size. The literature generally
measures landownership inequality with the Gini coecient. We dene landowner-
ship concentration as the share of large landholdings in a county. We argue that our
variable is better suited to capture the \extent" of serf labor in Prussia.1
Cross-sectional estimates show a signicant negative eect of landownership con-
centration on primary school enrollment rates. We show that this eect is robust to
the introduction of several demand and supply factors. In particular, we nd that
this negative eect is not due to a lower supply of schools or teachers.
We estimate the eect of landownership concentration on education for ve dif-
ferent years throughout the nineteenth-century. That allows to study how the eect
changes over time. We nd that the eect of landownership concentration decreases
substantially in the second half of the nineteenth-century. We suggest that (i) the
condition of limited freedom that characterized the peasantry under serfdom in the
1See section 3 for a detailed account of the distribution of power in Prussia. However, we will provide also
alternative estimates of the relationship between landownership inequality and education using the Gini coecient.
2rst half of the nineteenth-century and (ii) the successive peasants' emancipation
can explain the changes in the eect of landownership concentration on education
throughout the century.
In fact, peasants in eastern Europe had to provide serf labor to their landlord for
a few days a week (corv ee), they fell under the landlord's jurisdiction, and above
all they were not allowed to abandon the village without the landlord's permission
(Bowman, 1980). We argue that all these restrictions hindered peasants' demand
for education. It was only with the complete emancipation of the peasantry in the
second half of the nineteenth-century that the demand for education increased also
in the eastern areas of Prussia, catching up with the high levels of education of the
western regions.
In order to establish whether the negative eect of landownership concentration
on education is causal, we adopt an instrumental variables approach. Similar to
Easterly (2007) who uses land suitability for particular crops to identify exogenous
variation in inequality, we use soil characteristics at the county level to identify
exogenous variation in farm size and thus in landownership concentration (see also
Frankema (2010)). In particular, we use county level data reporting the compo-
sition of the soil in terms of clay, loam and sand. The instrument is based on
an empirical regularity extensively investigated in agricultural economics according
to which there is a systematic negative correlation between soil quality and farm
size (Bhalla and Roy, 1988; Bhalla, 1988; Benjamin, 1995). Regions with higher
soil quality historically experienced a stronger demand for land which determined
a more accentuated land fragmentation, whereas the opposite happened to the less
fertile areas of north-eastern Europe (Boserup, 1965). The assumption behind our
identication strategy is that soil texture has an eect on education only through
farm size. To ensure that the exclusion restriction is not violated, we introduce also
controls for land productivity in dierent crops. Instrumental variables estimates
suggest that the negative eect of land concentration on education is indeed causal.
We are also able to organize our data as a panel. That allows to estimate mod-
els with county xed eects which can rule out unobserved heterogeneity. Panel
estimates conrm the results obtained through the cross-sectional analysis: Within-
county variation in landownership concentration is negatively associated with changes
in enrollment rates.
Prussia provides an interesting case since it is representative of the dierent
agricultural institutions that characterized eastern and western parts of Europe.
Historically, western parts of Europe were comparatively more densely populated.
3Yet, during the Middle Ages, the Black Death and other plagues depopulated these
regions. Thus serf labor became more valuable to the lords and peasants achieved
more bargaining power resulting in more freedom and the progressive abolishment
of the manorial system. On the other hand, eastern European regions, including
Prussian regions east of the river Elbe, were more sparsely populated. Here, de-
population (also due to the Thirty Years' War) and a larger land-labor ratio led
to opposite results. The lords tried to control peasants' mobility by conscating
their land and bonding them to the manorial demesnes (Brenner, 1976; Domar,
1970). In addition, the increasing demand for grain from western Europe during the
seventeenth-century accentuated the use of serf labor in the East (Rosenberg, 1944,
p. 233).
Due to these developments the East became characterized by extensive agricul-
ture (grain crops) which led to an increasing concentration of large landholdings,
while large manorial farms disappeared in the West leading to a comparatively equal
distribution of land. Still, many regions were characterized by transitional stages.
Thus Prussia, presenting such heterogeneity, makes a perfect laboratory to study
the eect of dierent institutions on education. Our variable for landownership
concentration aims to capture such variation in local institutions.
In section 2 we review the related literature; in section 3 we provide the histor-
ical background emphasizing the Prussian reforms in agriculture and education; in
section 4 we describe the data; in section 5 we introduce the model and present
OLS estimates; in section 6 we address the issue of causality and show instrumental
variable estimates; in section 7 we present robustness checks, including estimates of
panel models; nally, in section 8 we conclude.
2 Related literature
The literature on the long-run economic consequences of inequality on human cap-
ital is vast. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that in the presence of credit market
imperfections, income distribution has a long-lasting eect on investment in human
capital. Other scholars stress the redistributive channel. In particular, Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) hypothesize that in a more egali-
tarian society taxation of physical capital and of human capital is lower, enhancing
economic growth.2
2For an exhaustive review of the literature see Galor (2011).
4Similarly, Ramcharan (2010) studies the eect of economic inequality on redis-
tributive policy. The author studies the relationship between land inequality (mea-
sured by the Gini coecient) and education expenditure using census data at the
county level in the U.S. for the period 1890-1930. The paper shows that greater
inequality is strongly associated with less redistribution and therefore with less ex-
penditure in education. Interesting for our case, the author shows that using a
measure for land concentration similar to what we use, the eect on per capita ed-
ucation expenditure is about four times as large as the impact estimated using the
Gini coecient (Ramcharan, 2010, p. 739). Ramcharan (2010) identies exogenous
variation in land inequality using geographic variables such as surface elevation,
rainfall, and crop choice.3
Galor et al. (2009) investigate the negative relationship between inequality in
landownership and the accumulation of human capital. Their theoretical model
shows that, due to a low degree of complementarity between human capital and
the agricultural sector, large landowners opposed the implementation of human-
capital promoting institutions such as public schooling.4 They test the prediction
of their model using variation in the distribution of landownership and educational
expenditure across states and over time in the U.S. for the period 1900-1940. Con-
sistently with their theoretical predictions, they nd that higher land inequality has
a negative eect on education expenditures. In order to ensure that the eect is
causal, they instrument landownership inequality through the interaction between
nationwide changes in the relative price of agricultural crops that are associated
with economies of scale and variation in climatic characteristics across states.
Go and Lindert (2010) explain dierences in enrollment rates between the North
and the South analyzing US counties in 1850. They point to local governments
having more autonomy and the population having more equally distributed political
voice in the North. Among other things, they test if extending the voting power to
lower income groups raises the taxes paid for schooling and thus the enrollment rates
in primary schools. Similarly, Vollrath (2010) nds that landownership inequality,
measured by the Gini coecient, predicts taxes for local school funding at the US
county level in 1890.
Other studies that attempt to establish the eect of political or economic inequal-
ity on education rest primarily on cross-country dierences. Mariscal and Sokolo
3For the long-run eects of property rights institutions on health and educational outcome you are referred to
Banerjee and Iyer (2005). Dell (2010), instead, analyzes the persistent eect on human capital of coercive labor
institutions.
4In a similar fashion, Galor and Moav (2006) suggest that the complementarity in production between physical
capital and human capital created an incentive for the capitalists to support the provision of public education.
5(2000) show how the extension of the franchise in Latin America increased schooling
by estimating the correlation between schooling and literacy rates with inequality in
political power. The relationship between the extension of the franchise and school-
ing has also been analyzed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Gallego (2010)
explores the role of historical variables and political institutions to explain dier-
ences in schooling in former colonies. He argues that the degree of democratization
positively aects primary education, whereas decentralization of political power is
more related to dierences in higher levels of schooling, such as secondary and higher
education.
Easterly (2007) tests the hypothesis of Engerman and Sokolo (1997) using agri-
cultural endowments as an instrument for inequality. He nds that inequality, mea-
sured with the Gini coecient and as the share of income accruing to the top quintile,
has a signicant negative causal eect on per capita income (in 2002), institutions,
and secondary school enrollment rates for the period 1998-2002 (Easterly, 2007,
p. 766, Table 4).
Our paper contributes to the literature by establishing the causal eect of the
concentration of large landholdings on primary school enrollment rate at the county
level for a single country. This is, to our knowledge, the rst study that explores
this relationship for a country in Europe. Most importantly, our dataset allows
to study how this relationship evolves throughout the nineteenth-century, a period
characterized by important institutional changes.
3 Historical background
3.1 Landownership and land reform
Prussia's agricultural systems were basically demarcated by the river Elbe. Agricul-
ture in the eastern areas was dominated by large landholdings and the Gutsherrschaft
system. The noble landowners (also known as Junkers) managed large demesnes,
while they leased the rest of their land to extract rents in form of servile duties and
fees. On the contrary, in western areas the Grundherrschaft system, characterized
by smaller landholdings, was more prevalent: noble landowners relied on cash rents
and leased most of the land to the peasants. Yet, this division was not unambiguous
and the characteristics varied strongly within these areas (Rosenberg, 1944). The
amount of servile dues and services usually depended on the attributes of the con-
tracted land and were the heaviest in regions with large noble demesnes (Melton,
1988, p 149). Most of the peasants were serfs not allowed to relocate without com-
6pensation payment and the permission of the lord. Becoming owner of the land they
cultivated was rarely possible. In fact, the landowner had control over jurisdiction
and policing and was patron over church and schools (Bowman, 1980, p. 787). Ap-
pointing school teachers was also one of his duties. In return, landowners had the
obligation to protect their subordinates and to support them in case of accidents.
In the eastern parts of Prussia, serfdom was abolished for the rst time towards
the end of the eighteenth-century on the royal domains. Eventually, the "Okto-
beredikt" of 1807 made all peasants free people starting from November 11 (St.
Martin's Day) 1810. In 1811 the reformer Hardenberg passed a regulation act on
landownership according to which all peasants gained the right to own landed prop-
erty of any type. Yet, the amount of compensation for land and foregone servile
duties was not claried for some time. Thus the reform did not gain momentum,
also due to the war on Napoleon, until a discharge act in 1821.
According to the act, peasants with the right to inherit the lease could compen-
sate by conveying one third of the land to the landlord while peasants on normal
lease had to convey up to half of the land in the eastern parts of Prussia. Because of
this practice and due to the dissolution of the common lands, average farm size of
the large landholders rose strongly until the mid of the nineteenth-century (Schiller,
2003).5 Exempted from the right to redeem the land were farmers on small parcels
who remained obliged to demesne services (this limitation reduced the eligible peas-
ants by roughly two thirds). In this way, the Junkers were still able to draw from a
large labor force (Harnisch, 1984). It was only with the Commutation Law in 1850
that all peasants ultimately gained complete legal emancipation and were able to
redeem small parcels (Pierenkemper and Tilly, 2004; Bowman, 1980).
During the Napoleonic occupation between 1807 and 1814, the western parts,
which belonged to Prussia after 1815, introduced the Napoleonic Code which basi-
cally meant the abolishment of feudal privileges. Serfdom was therefore abolished de
jure, in the Rhineland in 1805 and in Westphalia in 1808. Redemption of land was
based on the payment of 15 times the annual value of the servile duties in Rhineland,
and 25 times the annual value in Westphalia. In fact, Westphalian nobles blocked
many of the changes introduced by the Napoleonic Code. While the Code remained
eective after 1815 in the areas left of the river Rhine, all other areas (re-)established
Prussian law (Allgemeines Landrecht).6
5Many small farmers had to give up their land completely or where bought up by the large landowners.
6For more details about the regional adoption of reforms you are referred to Acemoglu et al. (2011) and the
corresponding online appendix.
73.2 The political power of the landowners
The political power on each level of Prussian administration was possessed by large
landowners, most of them noble and conservative.7 At the local level, the ordinary
landowning patron was responsible for the villages in his domains. As mentioned
above, the appointment of teachers was a responsibility of patrons and, according
to Neugebauer (1992, p.684), they were free to select teachers until 1900.8
At the county level, which had been introduced by the administrative reform of
1815, policing and administration was executed by the county chief (Landrat). He
was nominated by the owners of all knight estates, appointed by the King and had
to be owner of a knight estate located within county borders. Therefore the Landrat
represented the interests of the large landowners in the county assembly.9
Furthermore, each owner of a knight estate was also entitled to vote in the district
and the provincial assembly (Provinziallandtag), both introduced in 1824. Half
of the delegates represented the owners of knight estates called the First Estate,
one third represented the civic landowners, and one sixth of the votes were held
by peasants with large farms. These assemblies were advisors regarding property,
personal and tax laws and had legislative power at the municipal level.
Despite the progressive reforms of the Stein-Hardenberg era, many aspects of
the political power of landowners remained untouched throughout the nineteenth-
century. Finally, in 1872, a new order disposed the power of knight estates over
rural parishes and police and rearranged the composition of the county councils.
From that point onwards, large landowners were represented by only two fth of the
delegates; free rural parishes held the same share of votes and towns accounted for
one fth of the delegates.
3.3 Education reform
It was not before 1806 that mass education became an increasingly relevant issue in
Prussia. In fact, the King's previous edicts for compulsory education were attempts
to persuade local lords to provide education at their own expenses (Lindert, 2003,
2004). The war against France triggered a \decade of feverish activity" (Schleunes,
1979, p. 317) during which the expansion of schooling rushed. Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt, though head of cultural and educational aairs for only one year, is thought of
having laid down a vision with essential impact on the reform. He favored a general
7See Webb (1982) on how large landlords used their political power to introduce protective taris in Prussia.
8Note that teachers were only selected by noble landowners; the payment of teachers fell on the entire community.
9According to Wagner (2001) the position of a Landrat was often lled by landowners with rather modest
fortunes, who depended on the additional salary.
8education over specialization and advocated a unied schooling system which would
have educated everybody equally.10
Lindert (2004) reinterprets Prussian history of schooling as a bottom-up rather
than a top-down story. He claims that schooling had never been of special national
interest and was left to the local leaders. In fact, the expansion of elementary
education was pushed back by conservative feudal interest. Already in 1763, when
Prussia rst introduced compulsory schooling laws, the country squire's opposition
to mass education became specic and obvious. Especially among the Junkers of
Pomerania, themselves often illiterate, local opposition against education prevailed.
More educated peasants were said to run o to the cities or at least to use their
abilities to shirk.11 Literacy was seen as a potential weapon which might be used
by peasants to appeal to royal courts in order to reduce their servile duties (Melton,
1988).
These duties varied regionally and ranged from at least two days a week to daily
work. In parts of Pomerania, for example, peasant families had to provide two
servants, a boy, and four horses to work on the lord's demesne on a daily basis.
These duties remained partially eective even after the agricultural reform. In 1848
peasants claimed that they still had no personal freedom, since it did not matter if
they had to fulll the duties as serf-tenants or as owners of the land (Carsten, 1988,
p 98). Duties eectively concerned the children at school-age through the institu-
tion of menial service (Gesindezwang) which forced them to work as servants in the
Junkers' household. In the provinces of Pomerania and Silesia, Junkers drafted the
most promising and capable children of the peasantry to work as fulltime servants
(Carsten, 1988, p 63). Additionally, children were also burdened with the corv ee
(here: Scharrwerk) which, as the parish priest of Dombrowken (Eastprussia) com-
plained in 1773, was so much work that children were kept from attending school
even in the winter (Carsten, 1988, p 65).
In the countryside education remained closely connected to the church, where
teachers were often clergymen, most of the teachings were of religious sort, and
school inspection was enforced by the church. Though introduced already in 1794,
state supervision of elementary schooling remained dead letter. An edict from 1812
ruled to establish school boards, chaired by the patron, composed of the parish priest
10Humboldt thought that: Every man obviously is only a good craftsman, merchant, soldier or businessman if
he in general, and without regard to his profession, is a decent and enlightened person and citizen according to his
class. If school instruction is giving him what is necessary to achieve this, he will accomplish the abilities of his
profession with ease and will keep the freedom, like it often happens in life, to change from one to another (own
translation from von Humboldt (1964, p. 218)).
11For example, in 1763 another law prohibited the teaching of Latin in rural schools, since Landr ate repeatedly
claimed that the most stubborn and unrelenting peasants were exactly those who had studied Latin.
9and several heads of a family. In 1826 another decree suggested that patrons should
preferably appoint certied teachers.
Similarly to Lindert, Becker and Woessmann (2009) interpret the growth of
schooling in Prussia as a demand side expansion. While the population urged to
become more literate, a strong force to prevent them was the landowner. Reforms
thus gained more impact on free country parishes where school patronage was less
conservative. Also, secular school inspection became more usual in towns. In both
rural and urban areas secularization and the increase of public inuence on schooling
were a long-winded process lasting throughout the 19th century.
3.4 School nancing
The composition of sources for school funds in Prussia was not legally xed and it
diered by region or province. Large parts of the expenses were covered by school
assets like estates, entitlements or capital rents. Many of these assets had been
granted when the commons were divided during the agrarian reform (1811) or had
been given as donations. Assets were managed by so-called schooling societies,
bodies of the municipality which received additional taxes from the heads of each
household (excluding noble landowners) proportional to their wealth and income,
independent of their religious denomination and number of children. In those cases
where society funds were not sucient to support schools and teachers, tuition fees
were charged. Important for our case, the noble estate owners (Gutsbesitzer) were
obliged to support families which could not aord to pay for schooling. Otherwise
they were exempted from all taxes and therefore from any nancial support for the
schools (Kuhlemann, 1991). In addition, very poor school districts received nancial
support from the King (K onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1889, pp. 58-
59). It was only in 1888 that tuition fees were abolished and public funding became
xed. The exemption of noble estate owners from school nancing and school taxes
which had been legitimated in the "Allgemeines Landrecht" from 1794 was nally
abolished in 1906.
The Prussian Statistical Oce provides detailed information about public pri-
mary school nancing at the province level for 1861, 1864, 1867, 1871, 1878, and
1886. In Table 1 we show the total amount of school funds per capita at the province
level. Similarly to Lindert (2003, 2004), we nd that Eastern provinces had rela-
tively lower school funds compared to Western provinces. For example, primary
school funds amounted to about 1.4 Marks per capita in East- and Westprussia in
101861,12 whereas it amounted to 1.8 Marks in the Western province of Rhineland.
However, it is important to note that this dierence may reect dierentials in the
cost of living. In fact, if we deate school funds per capita with rye prices in 1861,
funds in the provinces of East- and Westprussia are 10 and 14% higher than in
Rhineland, respectively.13
School funds can be divided into three broad categories: local taxes and endow-
ments from school societies, tuition fees, and state funds. In Table 2 we show the
extent of state expenditures on public primary schooling at the province level. The
data show that, throughout the period considered, poor Eastern provinces such as
Eastprussia, Westprussia, and Poznan beneted to a larger extent from State contri-
butions than the Western provinces of Westphalia and Rhineland. Also the province
of Brandenburg received a relatively high contribution from the State.
On the contrary, school funds in Eastern provinces relied to a much lesser extent
on tuition fees. In 1861, in the provinces of Rhineland and Westphalia tuition fees
accounted for 24 and 27% of the total school funds, respectively; instead, in East-
and Westprussia tuition fees accounted for only 11 and 13% of the total school funds,
respectively.
Thus, the aggregate data show that school funds in Eastern areas were relatively
lower in nominal terms with respect to the richer and more urban regions of the
West, though in real terms the gap might have been nonexistent. Consistent with
this nding, we observe no appreciable dierence between East and West when
looking at the number of schools and teachers per child at school-age. In Figure
1 and 2 we plot the number of schools and of teachers per 100 children (6-14) for
25 districts by year (1816, 1849, 1864, 1886, 1896). To facilitate the interpretation,
the districts are sorted from East to West. One can immediately observe that, if
anything, Eastern districts had more schools per child at school-age compared to
Western districts. We obtain a very similar picture if we look at the number of
teachers per child at school-age.
Therefore, the lower (nominal) level of nancial support in the rural eastern areas
arguably did neither impact the availability of schools nor that of teachers.14 Supply
of education was not restrained in the Eastern regions. As we will demonstrate in
the rest of the paper, it was a lack of demand for education due to extractive
12Note that both provinces of East- and Westprussia belong to the East-Elbe part of the Kingdom of Prussia.
13The gap between school funds in East and West Prussia also decreases if we deate by wheat prices in 1861.
14Of course we cannot exclude that it aected their quality.
11institutions which explains the delay in educational attainment of the agricultural
Eastern regions of Prussia to a large extent.15
4 Data
4.1 Prussian census data
In order to test whether the concentration of large landownership, a proxy for the
institution of serf labor, delayed the expansion of education in Prussia, we collected
county level census data. Our data comprehend ve points in time (1816, 1849,
1864, 1886, 1896) spanning the entire nineteenth-century and come from various
sources published on behalf of the Royal Prussian Statistical Bureau in Berlin.16
The censuses contain a wealth of information, including data on education, land-
holdings by farm size, population, religion, and occupations. Given the inconsistency
of denitions for some important variables, we decided to base our main analysis
on cross-sectional comparisons. This approach allows to study how the eect of
landownership concentration varied during the nineteenth-century. However, we are
able to test our hypothesis organizing the data as a panel, accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Prussian county level data are challenging because of several changes in the ad-
ministrative boundaries. The number of counties in Prussia increased during the
nineteenth-century due to the fact that some counties were split into two or more
counties for administrative reasons (mostly population growth) or due to acquisition
of new territory. To achieve better comparability and to ensure that our results are
not driven by changes in administrative boundaries, we aggregate our variables to
a common set of boundaries. In particular, we aggregate census data to match the
borders of 1849. This was not possible for some variables in the 1816 cross-section
because, in some cases, counties were rst grouped and then newly divided. Thus
we decided to analyze the 1816 cross-section on the basis of its original structure.
For our dependent variable, we collected schooling data (enrollment rates) for the
years 1816, 1849, 1864, 1886 and 1896. Primary school enrollment rates represent
school attendance of the 6 to 14 years-old.17
15See Chaudhary (2009) about the role of private and public spending on education in India.
16See Appendix A.2 for more details about data sources.
17Consistent with the denition of mandatory schooling at the time, we consider both elementary schools (El-
ementarschulen) and middle schools (Mittelschulen) as primary schools. In a few cases enrollment rates exceed
100%. This could be due to children commuting from neighboring counties or because of children above age 14
enrolled in school.
12Data on landownership by size is available for the years 1816, 1849, 1858, 1882
and 1895. The Prussian censuses counted the number of landholdings per county and
classied them into size bins.18 The rst full census in 1816 classied landholdings
in 3 groups: properties or leasehold estates up to 15 Prussian Morgen (henceforth
PM), from 15 to 300 PM and more than 300 PM.19 This categorization reects
the contemporary agricultural structure of farming. Farmers with less than 15 PM
usually required some additional form of income. Landholdings between 15 and 300
PM were generally large enough for the subsistence of a family, whereas farms with
more than 300 PM were usually cultivated by laborers and serfs while the owner
was not expected to perform any manual work (Harnisch, 1984). The censuses of
1849 and 1858 extended the classication of landholdings from 3 to 5 bins. From
1882 onwards, the census considered only the arable land which was classied into
6 bins, increasing to 7 in the 1895 census.
Unfortunately, the total area of all holdings by bin-category was not published
until 1882, so the calculation of conventional measures of inequality is not straight-
forward. Also, since political power was to a large extent proportional to the size of
the possessed land (Eddie, 2008, p. 86), the share of largest landholdings seems to
be a variable better suited to capture that dimension of political inequality.
Our measure of landownership concentration is the number of landholdings larger
than 300 PM (circa 75 ha.) divided by the total number of holdings per county. To
allow inter-temporal comparisons, we dene large holdings as those which exceed
300 PM in the years 1816, 1849 and 1858 and 100 hectares (equal to 392 PM) in
1882 and 1895.20 Our indicator is therefore bounded between zero and one: the
larger the indicator, the higher is the share | the stronger the concentration | of
large landowners in the county. In this way, we aim to capture those large estates
which heavily relied on serf labor, and where peasants' freedom and mobility was
severely limited especially in the rst half of the nineteenth-century.
However, in order to compare our index of concentration with a more common
measure of inequality such as the Gini coecient, we need to compute the average
size of farms for each bin-category. For the years 1849 and 1858 we use district level
data on the average size of a farm by category from 1858. This information is not
18It is important to note that the original census data contains both types of tenure: landownership and land-
holding. Throughout the paper we use these terms interchangeably. Also note that the number of estates might not
be equal to the number of landowners/-holders since they might own/hold more estates at the same time. Similarly,
we are aware that both the King and the Church owned vast amounts of land. Unfortunately, the data do not allow
to identify the landowner. See Eddie (2008) for a discussion of farm statistics and property statistics.
19One PM is equal to circa 0.25 ha.
20This change in size is due to redenition of bin sizes by the Prussian Statistical Bureau when reforming mea-
surement from PM to hectare.
13available for 1816, therefore we assume the average area of a farm within each bin
to be the mean of each category. For the (open) top category with farms of more
than 300 PM, we use a value of 3000 PM. We choose this value in order to get an
overall inequality in 1816 consistent with the trend we observe for the successive
years. In fact, in the period 1849-1896 the Gini coecient increases from 0.70 to
about 0.76 (see Table 3). With the value of 3000 PM for the top open category, the
Gini coecient for 1816 is about 0.65.21
Our covariates aim to control for dierent aspects of the demand and supply
of education. We include the share of Protestant population as Protestants are
expected to have a higher demand for education, the share of urban population,
the share of population employed in the industrial sector,22 the share of population
employed in agriculture, and population density.23 The age structure of the county
might also inuence the demand for education.24 In our case this factor is proxied
by the child dependency ratio, calculated as the share of the young population (0
to 14/18) over the working population (15/19 to 65/70). Additionally we control
for the share of the population whose rst language is not German.25 This variable
controls for dierences between the former Polish parts of Prussia (Poznan, Silesia
and West-Prussia) and Germany where the demand for education might have been
lower for linguistic and cultural reasons. This variable is inversely correlated with the
share of Protestants as the Polish population was predominantly Catholic. Finally,
we also control for the supply of schools using school density, dened as the number
of schools per square kilometer.
Quite importantly, inheritance laws dier across Prussia and that might have an
impact on our analysis. In fact, inheritance laws follow a geographical pattern: The
north-eastern parts of Prussia are dominated by non partible inheritance (Aner-
benrecht), while the south-western parts are characterized by partible inheritance
(Realteilung). This clearly leads to a dierent average size of landownership in the
south-western counties. In our empirical analysis, we shall take this institutional
dierence into account with a binary variable which takes on value one in counties
with partible inheritance.
21Note that our results do not change qualitatively when we use the lower values 300, 600, 1000, or 2000 for the
open category.
22Given the low level of industrialization in Prussia in the rst decades of the nineteenth-century, for 1816 we
calculate the number of looms over the total population as an indicator of non-agricultural occupation.
23Unfortunately the 1816 census provides only information on the laborers in agriculture, whereas the 1849 census
provides information on the total population in agriculture, including family members.
24About the relationship between fertility and education in pre-demographic transition Prussia see Becker et al.
(2010, 2012).
25Unfortunately the earliest available census data about spoken languages is from 1890.
144.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of our variables for each year separately. The
rst thing to note is the relatively high levels of enrollment rates. Already in 1816,
about 60 percent of children aged 6-14 were enrolled in primary schools (see also
Becker and Woessmann (2010)). Subsequently, we can observe an increase in average
enrollment rates over time, rising from 60% in 1816 to 94% in 1895. Interestingly,
the enrollment rate in 1864 is lower compared to the previous census in 1849.26
The variable large landholdings indicates the share of the largest holdings in
the county. In 1816, 1.7% of the holdings belonged to this category (>300 PM).
Due to problems of consistency of the denitions, we can only compare the values
of landownership concentration for 1816, 1849 and 1864 directly. The descriptive
statistics show that the share of large landholdings increased during the rst half
of the nineteenth-century, reaching a share of 2.5% in 1858.27 This evidence is
consistent with the accounts of the agrarian reform in Prussia which stress how the
landed elite beneted most from the reforms (Schiller, 2003).
As mentioned, a direct comparison with 1882 and 1895 is not straightforward
since these censuses only account for the size of arable land. Furthermore, the
unit of measurement in these censuses is the hectare and thus the top bin-category
changes to 100 hectare.28 This explains why our concentration index decreases to
0.8% in 1882 and to 1% in 1895.
The progress of industrialization is shown by the increase of urbanization which
rises from 24% to 30% and industrial employment which increases from 1% to 12%.
These variables provide large variations both across counties and over time, whereas
variables such as religious denomination, language, and inheritance system are rather
time invariant.
Figure 3 and 4 show the geographic distribution of enrollment rates and the con-
centration of landownership in 1849, respectively. Enrollment rates are higher in
the central part of Prussia, whereas tend to be lower in the eastern areas, espe-
cially in the province of Posen. Becker and Woessmann (2009) suggest that, due
to the inuence of the Protestant Reformation, literacy as a by-product of Protes-
tantism tended to spread almost concentrically around Wittenberg. The geographic
distribution of the concentration of landownership is almost the reverse of Figure
3, as areas with lower enrollment rates are now characterized by a relatively high
26This peculiarity has already been found by Lindert (2004, p. 91, Tab. 5.1).
27The year 1864 in the table headings refers to the date for which data on enrollment rates are available.
28100 hectares are equal to 392 PM.
15concentration of large holdings. Western areas are strongly characterized by small
holdings, though also western counties present a certain degree of variation.
5 OLS results
In this section we test the hypothesis of a negative association between the con-
centration of large landowners and school enrollment in Prussia. We estimate this
relationship for ve dierent cross-sections in the nineteenth-century to understand
if and to what extent the landed elite lost inuence in opposing the expansion of
mass education.
We estimate a standard OLS model where the enrollment rate edu is a function of
the concentration of landownership land, plus a vector of covariates X for a county
i in a given year t:
edu
t







1 is the coecient of interest. The vector X contains the share of Protestants in
the county, the share of population living in urban centers, the share of the popu-
lation working in the industrial sector, the share of the population in agriculture,
population density, and the child dependency ratio. In addition we control for school
density, for inheritance laws using a binary variable which takes on value one for
partible inheritance, and the share of the population whose rst language is not
German.
The results of the OLS estimates are presented in Table 4. We consistently
nd a signicant negative association between the share of large landholdings and
the enrollment rate. This eect, very large in 1816, seems to fade throughout the
nineteenth-century. As already mentioned, it is possible to compare the magnitudes
of the coecients of the rst three years (1816, 1849, and 1864) as the variables are
dened similarly and have the same unit of measurement. In fact, the coecient for
1816 is statistically larger than the coecient for 1849, whereas the coecients for
1849 and 1864 are not statistically dierent.
Comparing the coecients over the entire period might lead to problematic con-
clusions. Since the dependent variable is theoretically bounded between zero and
one, the steady increase in enrollment rates over time leads to decreasing variation.
This might lead to a decrease in the coecients over time due to a shrinking vari-
ation of the dependent variable. Therefore, we provide the interpretation of the
eects also in terms of standard deviations.
16In fact, the estimated eects are quite large. In 1816, an increase in the share
of large estates by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease of the en-
rollment rate by about 0.34 standard deviations. In 1849 the eect is about 0.31
standard deviations, whereas it is 0.29 standard deviations for 1864. Finally, in the
last two years 1886 and 1896, an increase by one standard deviation in landowner-
ship concentration implies a decrease of the county enrollment rate by 0.09 standard
deviations.
As already shown in Becker and Woessmann (2009), there is a positive rela-
tionship between Protestantism and educational attainment which, however, loses
signicance in the last two cross sections. Another interesting result stems from
the industrial variable. We observe that the coecient becomes positive from 1849
and highly signicant from 1886. This result is consistent with the study of Becker
et al. (2011) which argues that, dierently than in Britain, education was causal for
industrialization in Prussia.29
Cultural dierences in valuing education are captured by the `language' variable.
Counties with a higher share of non-German speaking population, mostly of Slavic
origin, show signicant lower levels of enrollment rates. Given that we control for
the share of Protestants, the estimated eect captures cultural values that lie outside
the religious sphere.
In our case it is important to note the signicant positive relationship between
school density and enrollment rates throughout the whole period. This result indi-
cates that the supply of schools was not the mechanism through which large landown-
ers opposed the spread of mass education. If that were the case, the coecient 1
attached to large landholdings should decrease when controlling for school density.
We actually nd that the eect of large landholdings slightly increases when con-
trolling for school density.
Clearly school density is to a large extent endogenous to enrollment rates. How-
ever, it is reasonable to argue that the number of schools might have responded
with some delay to an increase in the demand for education. This seems to be the
case when we observe the trend of schools per child over time: Despite a steady
increase in school enrollment, the number of schools per 100 children aged 6-14 de-
29This is especially true for non-textile sectors. The authors also go a step forward showing that the eect of
education on industrialization is causal. Note that dierent from Becker et al. (2011) we do not exclude hand driven
looms in the 1849 cross-section.
17creased substantially, at least until 1886.30 Therefore, it seems justiable to use
school density as a covariate in our model.31
In sum, OLS estimates show that landownership concentration has a strong nega-
tive association with enrollment rates in nineteenth-century Prussia. Results suggest
that the eect of landownership concentration on education diminished throughout
the century. The complete emancipation of the peasantry in the second half of the
nineteenth-century is likely to have triggered a higher demand for education.
6 Establishing causality
6.1 The causal eect of landownership concentration
The eects estimated by OLS are not causal as they might be aected by omitted
variable bias or reverse causality. A variable which is correlated with both landown-
ership and enrollment rates would bias our results. In addition, reverse causality
might also be an issue. Peasants with a higher level of education might have been
comparatively more able to appeal to the King in order to obtain better tenants
conditions. Peasants with a higher level of education might also increase the pro-
ductivity of the land they work. In a xed-rent regime, this could imply that higher
education peasants might have been more able to redeem their land. Finally, higher
educated peasants might have had a higher incentive to sell their (small) estate to a
large landowner in order to reap the benets of their education in other trades. All
these mechanisms would bias previous OLS estimates.
In order to overcome such problems, we adopt an instrumental variable approach.
Similar to Easterly (2007), we identify the causal eect of land concentration on ed-
ucation using exogenous variation in farm size due to dierences in the geological
composition of the soil (soil texture). In fact, a 1866 census assessed the composition
of the soil at the county level and classied it into three categories: (i) loam and
& clay, (ii) sandy-loam and loamy-sand, (iii) and sand. Terrain of the rst cate-
gory (loam & clay) tend to be relatively more fertile; sandy areas, instead, are the
least fertile, whereas fertility of counties with a prevalence of the second category
are somewhere in between. In Figure 5 we display the relative dominance of each
category. Darker areas are those under the rst category, therefore with a higher
soil quality; areas with brighter colors are dominated by soil of lower quality.
30Schools per child (6-14) were 1.025 in 1816, 0.817 in 1849, 0.716 in 1864, 0.646 in 1886, and 0.754 in 1896.
31We decided to use school density instead of school per child (6-14) because we believe that the former is better
suited to capture the cost associated with reaching the next school. It is important to note that throughout the
paper our results are almost identical if we control for school per child.
18There are a few mechanisms which corroborate our instrumental variable strat-
egy. In fact, there is a vast literature in agricultural economics which nds a sys-
tematic negative correlation between soil quality and farm size (Bhalla and Roy,
1988; Bhalla, 1988; Benjamin, 1995). Regions which exhibit relatively lower quality
of soil, therefore with lower marginal value of land, experience a lower demand for
land and are thus characterized by higher average farm sizes (Barrett et al., 2010;
Bhalla and Roy, 1988; Bhalla, 1988). This is indeed the pattern followed by north-
eastern European regions during the Middle Ages where the local lords, in order
to attract more agricultural workers and encourage migration, granted the peas-
ants with higher levels of freedom compared to the manorial system in the West
(Rosenberg, 1943). It was only after the Black Death epidemics in the 14th century
that serfdom developed in eastern Europe, establishing the roots of landownership
inequality that we observe also in the nineteenth-century.
Eastwood et al. (2010, p. 3355) answer the question why the so called colonial
land grab, which predominantly installs large landholdings in underpopulated ar-
eas, is not adjusted over time when labor mobility grows, with life-style advantages
for large farmers, local extra-economic status and power, and ethnic barriers lim-
iting incentives to turn to more ecient small scale farming. In fact, by 1427,
large landowners started to restrict freedom of movement of peasants and agricul-
tural workers and increasingly exploited obligatory labor services (Rosenberg, 1944,
p. 231-232).
On the other hand, regions with relatively higher soil quality experience a stronger
demand for land which determines a more accentuated land fragmentation and more
secure property rights. According to Boserup (1965); Binswanger and McIntire
(1987); Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986), increasing population pressure results
in increasing intensication of land use and in a growing pressure for security of land
tenures (Eastwood et al., 2010). In fact, we nd that in the regions of Rheinland
and parts of Saxony and Silesia, where the soil is dominated by loam and clay (i.e.
higher quality), farm size is small on average, leading to a low concentration of
large landholdings (compare Figure 4 and 5). In addition, soil quality might also
inuence crop choice which, in turn, due to economies of scale, might aect the nal
distribution of land (Vollrath, 2009). The advantage of our instrument with respect
to crop choice is that soil quality is a \true" exogenous variable, whereas crop choice
is still a choice variable, although heavily dependant on the type of terrain.32
32In this fashion, Easterly (2007) uses the suitability of crops such as sugar and wheat instead of actual crop
production to identify exogenous variation in inequality.
19Thus, our rst stage is expressed by the following equation:
land
t





where land is the variable for landownership concentration, SOIL is a vector of
variables describing soil texture, and X is the vector of covariates of equation 1.
The exclusion restriction demands that soil texture has no direct eect on enrollment
rates. In order to ensure that the exclusion restriction is not violated, we additionally
control for yields per hectare of the most common crops (wheat, rye, barley, oats
and potatoes).
In principle, the vector SOIL should contain the three variables that characterize
the geological composition of soil, namely the dierent shares of loam & clay, sandy-
loam and loamy-sand, or sand. Yet, the soil variables are highly correlated with
each other: for instance, the correlation between the share of loam & clay and
the share of sand is  0:7. Such a high correlation might inuence the rst stage
regression, weakening the performance of our instruments. Therefore, we use a
principal component analysis (PCA)33 in order to recover two components that are
uncorrelated by construction.34 The rst component explains 66.4% of the total
variation of the three soil variables, whereas the second component explains an
additional 32.9% of the variation. Thus, these two components add to more than
99% of the variation in soil texture.35
6.2 Instrumental variable results
First stage estimates of equation 2 are presented in the upper panel of Table 5. The
two components are signicantly correlated with landownership concentration. The
rst component is negative for loam & clay and picks up variation where landown-
ership is less concentrated, leading to a positive correlation. The second component
is positive for sandy-loam and loamy-sand and picks up variation in regions where
landownership is highly concentrated. The power of the instrument is summarized
by the rst stage F-statistics, which, with the exception of 1816, are very close to
or above the standard threshold value of 10.
33Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique used to reduce the number of variables in an
analysis describing a series of uncorrelated linear combinations of the variables that contains most of the variance.
See Appendix A.1 for more details.
34It is important to note that using the three soil variables as instruments provides virtually the same results,
though in that case the F-statistics of the rst stage indicate a weak performance of the instruments.
35For a similar approach see Galor et al. (2009). In their paper, they use a geographic element and a relative price
element to identify exogenous variation in land distribution. The geographic element is constituted by variables
such as temperature, rainfall and heating. Given the high correlation between these three variables, they also resort
to a principal component analysis.
20Second stage estimates are presented in the lower panel of Table 5. The results
conrm the negative eect of landownership concentration on education and imply
that the eect is indeed causal. Also in this case, there seems to be a fading eect of
landownership concentration over time, although the inconsistency of the denitions
across the censuses does not allow to be denitive on the matter. Yet, this seems
to imply that the abolishment of serfdom and the emancipation of the peasantry
triggered a stronger demand for education. The opposition of the large landown-
ers towards the spread of mass education faded more or less steadily through the
nineteenth-century, reaching a lower but stable level in the last part of the century.
Our IV estimates imply that OLS estimates are downward biased. This results is
consistent with the ndings of Easterly (2007). Instrumenting inequality using the
the ratio between the suitability of wheat to sugar crops, he nds that IV estimates
are about three times larger compared to OLS estimates (Easterly, 2007, p.766,
Table 4). A similar ratio between IV and OLS estimates is found by Ramcharan
(2010).
In terms of magnitude, we nd that if the share of large estates in the county
increases by one standard deviation, the enrollment rate would decrease by about
0.93 standard deviations in 1816, 0.85 standard deviations in 1849, 0.57 standard
deviations in 1864, 0.28 standard deviations in 1886, and 0.19 standard deviations
in 1896.36 It implies that if the share of large landholdings in 1849 had doubled (for
instance from the average of 2.4 to 4.8%), the enrollment rate in primary schools
would have decreased by almost nine percentage points. A similar increase at the
end of the century (from the average of 0.8 to 1.6%) would have resulted in only one
percentage point lower enrollment rates.
7 Robustness checks
7.1 Agricultural productivity
The exclusion restriction is violated if soil texture has a direct eect on enrollment
rates. This might be the case if, for instance, soil fertility led to variation in employ-
ment of child-labor in agriculture and thus drove children out of school. In order to
tackle this problem, we additionally include productivity measures of the most im-
portant crops in our analysis. However, detailed county-level information on yields
36These ndings do not depend on the threshold of 300 PM chosen to dene large landholdings. For instance,
for 1849 and 1864 it is possible to use the bin-category over 600 PM, and for 1896 the bin-category over 200 ha.
Results are qualitatively similar when using these categories.
21is only available for the years 1886 and 1896. Therefore, we decided to combine the
1886 yields data with the earlier cross-sections.37
Estimates presented in Table 6 show that controlling for yields per acre leads to
similar results as in Table 5.38 While the coecient for large landholdings in 1849
and 1864 show a signicant negative eect, the point estimates in 1886 and 1896
are smaller and insignicant. That suggests, again, that the eect of landownership
concentration tended towards zero at the end of the nineteenth-century.
7.2 Urban vs rural
It could be argued that the relationship we estimate should exclude cities, since
urban and rural landownership (and education) might be very dierent. Unfortu-
nately we can only separate urban and rural data for the 1849 census. In that case,
using only rural enrollment and landownership data, leaving all other variables un-
changed, we nd the same qualitative results (Table 7, column 6). In order to tackle
this issue further, we can exclude those counties which consist only of a city.39 The
estimates, presented in Table 7, are consistent with the results discussed so far. As
expected, with the only exception of 1864, the rst-stage F-statistics suggest that
the instruments are stronger when omitting city counties.
7.3 East vs West
Further concerns might arise due to the accentuated east-west gradient, most of all
regarding landownership concentration. In fact, we can show that when excluding
the two western provinces of Rheinland and Westphalia, results (both for OLS and
IV) are qualitatively similar, conrming the ndings discussed throughout the paper.
Analogously, one could argue about the existence of an east-west gradient re-
garding school nancing. However, as discussed in more detail in Section 3.4, the
dierences in school funds in real terms were probably low. In fact, we observe that
the supply of schools and teachers was not restrained in the East with respect to the
richer regions of the West (see Figures 1 and 2). As we are trying to demonstrate,
it was a lack of demand for education due to extractive institutions which explains
to a large extent the delay in educational attainment of the agricultural Eastern
regions of Prussia.
37We are aware that assuming constant productivity dierences over time is a strong assumption. However, for
completeness, we decided to show results for all cross-sections.
38For a small number of counties information about productivity is not reported in the censuses because the
considered crops were not cultivated. That explains the smaller number of observations.
39The city-counties are Aachen, Berlin, Danzig, Halle, Frankfurt/Oder, K oln, K onigsberg, Magdeburg, M unster,
Potsdam.
227.4 The Gini coecient
As explained in more detail in section 3, political power in nineteenth-century Prus-
sia was associated with the size of land property. We argued that our measure of
land concentration is better suited to capture the extent of labor exploitation than
standard measures of inequality. In fact, our concentration variable can dier sub-
stantially from a standard measure of inequality such as the Gini coecient. Let
us assume an extreme case where a given county has 100 landholdings and assume
that all the holdings belong to the largest category (> 300 PM). In this case, the
Gini coecient would be equal to zero since land is equally distributed among the
100 large landholders. Our concentration variable, instead, would take the value of
one since large landholdings represents 100% of the total number of holdings. In
such an extreme case, we expect to nd a particularly low level of enrollment rates
as all (landless) workers are bound, through the serfdom system, to the few large
landowners. We argue that this institutional setting, for a given level of supply of
education, inhibited the demand for schooling.
In order to compare our measure of land concentration with standard inequality
measures, we compute the Gini coecient and estimate its eect on education.40
Results are reported in the upper panel of Table 8. The Gini coecient has no
eect on school enrollment rates and the same result holds if we use alternative
measures for inequality such as the Theil index.41
Yet, it is important to note that the Gini coecient computed across all land-
holdings does not consider landless agricultural workers. We correct for this using a
method proposed by Vollrath (2010, p. 8-9) which incorporates the total number of
adult males.42 In particular, the adjusted Gini is equal to pG + (1   p), where p is
the ratio of landholdings to adult males and G is the standard Gini coecient. The
lower the number of farms with respect to the adult male population, the larger is
the adjusted Gini with respect to the standard Gini. The descriptive statistics in
Table 3 show that the adjusted Gini is systematically larger than the standard Gini.
In the lower panel of Table 8 we present OLS estimates when regressing enrollment
rates on the adjusted Gini. As expected, the standard Gini underestimates the
relationship between land inequality and enrollment rates. The results using the
40For 1886 and 1896, we merged the two smallest categories in order to have an homogenous bin size of 0-2
hectares. This seems to be particularly sensible for 1896 where the smallest bin size (0-0.5 hectares) is likely to
include also small private gardens. In this way we dilute this category in the next largest one which we expect to
include truly small landholders.
41Result are similar for dierent generalized entropy indices.
42One could argue that our concentration index should also be adjusted for landless agricultural workers. This
does not apply to our case since our variable is intended to capture average farm size which, in turn, is a proxy for
the institution of serfdom.
23adjusted Gini show that, for the rst half of the nineteenth-century, the relationship
between land inequality and enrollment rates is negative and signicant.
The soil texture information used to identify exogenous variation in land concen-
tration appear to be a rather weak instrument for the standard and the adjusted
Gini. Therefore instrumental variable estimates generate coecients with a very
large bias.43 However, we can show that the pattern of the results is very similar
to the results discussed above: after the eective abolition of serfdom and with the
complete emancipation of peasantry, the relationship between land inequality and
enrollment rates ceases to be signicant.
7.5 Panel models
In this section, we construct a panel dataset which allows to address the issue of
unobserved heterogeneity. Time-invariant initial dierences across counties which
are not fully accounted for might aect estimates of equation 1. Panel models with
county xed eects solve this problem. In fact, xed eect estimates show how
changes in landownership concentration aect changes in enrolment rates within
counties. In order to maintain constant borders we aggregate the data to resemble
the administrative structure in place in 1800. Thus, our estimates are based on a
panel consisting of 280 counties i observed at ve points in time t (1816, 1849, 1864,
1886, 1896):
eduit = 3landit + i + t + Xit3 + it (3)
where i and t are county and time xed eects, respectively.
As already mentioned in section 4, the census denition of landownership changed
substantially in the last part of the century, including only arable land starting from
1882. Time xed eects, beyond capturing average changes over time, will also take
into account the change in denition for landownership.
Panel estimates are presented in Table 9. We show specications using landowner-
ship concentration and the adjusted Gini alternatively. For comparison, in columns
1 and 4 we present pooled models with neither county nor time xed eects. In the
next columns we sequentially introduce county and time xed eects.
In all specications we nd a signicant negative eect of landownership concen-
tration and the adjusted Gini on enrollment rates. Including time xed eects does
not change the results qualitatively. In fact, time xed eects reinforce the coe-
cient of the adjusted Gini (column 6) whereas it reduces the eect of landownership
43Results not presented but available upon request.
24concentration (column 3). The latter can be explained by the removal of the scale
eect triggered by the change in the denition of landownership for the last two
censuses.
In sum, the panel analysis conrms the ndings of the previous sections. The
magnitude of the coecients estimated in the panel models is consistent with the
ones estimated through OLS and IV. This implies that the results obtained in the
cross-sectional analysis are not aected by unobserved heterogeneity at the county
level.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we show to what extent landownership concentration, a proxy for
the extractive institution of serfdom, aected the spread of primary education in
nineteenth-century Prussia. We argue that landowners hampered peasants' demand
for education through the institution of serf labor, delaying the spread of mass
primary education.
Indeed, using a unique county level dataset that covers the entire nineteenth-
century, we nd that counties with a higher share of large landholdings had sig-
nicantly lower enrollment rates. This result holds when controlling for several
demand and supply factors, including the availability of schools and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization. We provide evidence that the negative eect of landownership
concentration weakened over time, suggesting a diminishing inuence of the landed
elite towards the end of the nineteenth-century. This timing is consistent with our
proposed mechanism of labor exploitation, since peasants gained their complete legal
emancipation de facto only around 1850.
To overcome possible biases due to omitted variables and reverse causality we
adopt an instrumental variable approach. We identify the causal eect of landown-
ership concentration on education using exogenous variation in farm size due to
dierences in the geological composition of the soil (soil texture). Regions which
exhibit relatively lower quality of soil, therefore with lower marginal value of land,
experienced historically a lower demand for land and are thus characterized by higher
average farm sizes. On the contrary, regions with relatively higher soil quality ex-
perienced a stronger demand for land which determined a more accentuated land
fragmentation in the long run.
Instrumental variable estimates conrm the negative eect of landownership con-
centration on education and suggest that the eect is indeed causal. The estimates
25also conrm that the eect diminished over time, supporting the proposed mecha-
nism of serf labor as explanation of the negative relationship between landownership
concentration and education.
Finally, we construct a panel dataset which allows to rule out unobserved hetero-
geneity as a potential bias of our cross-sectional estimates. County and time xed-
eects estimates conrm the existence of a signicant negative eect of landowner-
ship concentration on enrollment rates also within counties.
We suggest that the institution of serf labor, by limiting the freedom of peasant
households, made any investment in formal education unprotable, notwithstanding
the presence of schools and teachers. Successively, the abolition of serf labor and
the full emancipation of the peasantry triggered an increasing demand for primary
education which allowed eastern areas to catch-up with areas characterized by higher
levels of education.
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31A Appendix
A.1 Soil data and principal component analysis
The instrument soil texture is developed using data from a 1866 classiﬁcation of soil.
As a means to unify land taxes across provinces, the Prussian government released
a law to determine soil, location, terrain, climate, humidity, accessibility, credit and
all other aspects aﬀecting the rate of return to each farm. These information were
collected between 1861 and 1864 in each county by an assessment commission of 4
to 10 members, half of which were elected by the local assembly and the other half
chosen by the central government. Of the total 2494 members of the commission,
701 were owners of knight estates and 1181 were other landowners, while the rest
were public servants and landless farmers. Land surveying was conducted by ap-
proximately 3300 trained technical measurers. The local classiﬁcation of soil was
conducted by the 3 members of the commission, including the commissar and one
technical measurer. The soil was either drilled or dug, classiﬁed and sketched into
maps. Soil samples were taken in order to compare them to other soils in the same
classiﬁcation. The samples and their exact location had to be attached to the survey
protocol and were send to the district commission. The district commission visited
each county and compared the samples. The classiﬁcation into tax classes was then
made available to the municipalities, to estate owners and to county assemblies for
objection. The average surveyed area was 568 Prussian Morgen per day, summing
to total of 188,587 days of work. Given that our data provides county level averages
of soil texture, possible biases due to systematic misreporting for purposes of tax
evasion should be minimized. The data reports the total area, the area of loam and
clay soils, the area of sandy loam and loamy sand soils, and the area of sand soils.
In order to display the relative dominance of each of these arable soil categories
we calculate their shares in total soil. Since the soil shares are highly correlated at
the county level, we can not use the original values as instruments without artiﬁ-
cially inﬂating the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst stage regressions. Thus we use principal
component analysis (PCA) in order to eliminate correlation among the variables.
We choose the ﬁrst two components of the PCA which explain 99.3 percent of the
variation in the soil variables as our instruments. The ﬁrst component has an eigen-
value of 1.97 and its loadings are -0.71 for loam and clay, 0.49 for sandy loam and
loam sand, and 0.51 for sand. The second component has and eigenvalue of 1.01
and its loadings are 0 for loam and clay, 0.72 for sandy loam and loam sand, and
-0.7 for sand. The source of the soil data is Meitzen (1868, vol. 4).
32A.2 Data sources
We have compiled a county-level database covering all Prussian counties over the
nineteenth-century. The data were collected in several censuses by the Royal Prus-
sian Statistical Bureau and obtained from several sources. We combine these data
to prepare ﬁve cross section using censuses from the years 1816, 1849, 1864, 1886
and 1896 or, if not available, as close as possible to these years. We accounted for
changes in the administrative boundaries of counties by adjusting all sources to the
1849 county borders. An exclusion is made for the 1816 cross section since it was not
possible to calculate landownership data according to the administrative borders of
1849. Demographers consider nineteenth-century county-level data from Prussia as
a unique source of highest-quality data for analysis at a micro-regional level (Gal-
loway et al., 1994). Few of the data used for the 1886 and 1896 cross section were
taken from Galloway (2007).
1816 cross-section
The Prussian Statistical Oﬃce, founded in 1805, started to publish detailed data at
the county and municipality level in 1825. The data contain information from cen-
suses in 1816, 1819, and 1821. The 1816 census provides information on education,
landownership, population, demography, and religion. The 1819 census provides
data on some occupations and means of production.
The 1816 census classiﬁes landownership in 3 groups: properties or leasehold estates
with up to 15 Prussian Morgen (PM), 15 to 300 PM and more than 300 PM. From
this we construct landownership concentration as the share of estates with more than
300 PM. The county-level data also report on public elementary schools (¨ Oﬀentliche
Elementarschulen), the only school type equally available in rural areas and towns
at the time. In addition, the 1816 census reports school data for the 172 medium
and large towns in Prussia, which provide additional information on types of schools
available only in towns: private elementary schools (Privat-Elementarschulen), pub-
lic middle schools for boys or girls (¨ Oﬀentliche Buerger- und Mittelschulen f¨ ur S¨ ohne
oder T¨ ochter), and private middle schools for boys or girls (Private B¨ urger- und Mit-
telschulen f¨ ur S¨ ohne oder T¨ ochter). Children at recommended school age (6 to 14
years) could either attend elementary schools or middle schools, which had a broader
curriculum as well as more grades. To capture all children at recommended school
age, county and town enrollment data are aggregated to compute enrollment. The
331816 and 1819 censuses are also used to compute most of the other control variables
for the 1816 cross-section.
(i) The share of Protestants is deﬁned as the number of Protestants in 1816 divided
by the total population in 1816.
(ii) The share of urban population is deﬁned as the number of people living in cities
which held city rights in 1816 divided by the total population in 1816.
(iii) The share of the population in the industrial sector is deﬁned as the number of
looms in 1819 over the total population in 1816 (since Prussia was not industrialized
in 1816 we choose this as an indicator of proto-industrial occupations).
(iv) The share of the population in agriculture is deﬁned as the number of servants
in agriculture in 1819 over the total population in 1816 (no data is available for the
total number of people in agriculture for this period).
(v) The child dependency ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the population younger
than 15 years to the population between 15 and 60 years in 1816.
(vi) The population density is deﬁned as the number of people per square kilometer
of land area in the county in 1816.
(vii) The school density is deﬁned as the number of schools per square kilometer of
land area in the county in 1816.
The source of the 1816 and 1819 census data is M¨ utzell (1823-1825, vol. 5-6).
1849 cross-section
The 1849 census classiﬁes landownership in 5 groups: possessions (Besitzungen) with
up to 5 PM, 5 to 30 PM, 30 to 300 PM, 300 to 600 PM and more than 600 PM. From
this we construct landownership concentration as the share of estates with more
than 300 PM. The census also reports education information on public elementary
schools (¨ Oﬀentliche Elementarschulen) and public middle schools for boys or girls
(¨ Oﬀentliche Mittelschulen f¨ ur S¨ ohne oder T¨ ochter). To calculate enrolment rates
we divide the number of attending students in 1849 by the number of children at
school age between 6 and 14 in 1849.
The deﬁnition of the control variables (i), (ii), (v), (vi), and (vii) is similar to the
1816 census only using data from the 1849 census.
(iii) The share of the population in the industrial sector is deﬁned as the number
people working as craftsmen or in factories in 1849 over the total population in 1849.
(iv) The share of the population in agriculture is deﬁned as the number of people
subsisting from agriculture in 1849 over the total population in 1849 (The enumer-
ator includes all family members, servants and farm-laborers).
34The source of the 1849 census data is Statistisches Bureau zu Berlin (1851-1855,
vol. 1-6b).
1864 cross-section
Unfortunately the 1864 census does not provide information on landownership. Thus
we access landownership data from the agricultural census in 1858 which classiﬁes
landownership in 5 groups: possessions (Besitzungen) with up to 5 PM, 5 to 30
PM, 30 to 300 PM, 300 to 600 PM and more than 600 PM. From this we con-
struct landownership concentration as the share of estates with more than 300 PM
(Meitzen, 1868).
The 1864 census reports education information on public elementary schools (¨ Oﬀentliche
Elementarschulen), private elementary schools (Privat-Elementarschulen), public
middle schools for boys or girls (¨ Oﬀentliche Mittelschulen f¨ ur S¨ ohne oder T¨ ochter),
and private middle schools for boys or girls (Private Mittelschulen f¨ ur S¨ ohne oder
T¨ ochter). To calculate enrolment rates we divide the number of attending students
in 1864 by the number of children at school age between 6 and 14 in 1864.
The deﬁnition of the control variables (i), (ii), (vi), and (vii) is similar to the 1816
census only using data from the 1864 census.
Unfortunately the 1864 census is missing occupational information for the city coun-
ties (Stadtkreise). We thus access data from the 1867 census to construct the occu-
pation controls.
(iii) The share of the population in the industrial sector is deﬁned as the number
of people employed in mining and industry (including construction) in 1867 over
the total population in 1867 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934,
vol. 16b).
(iv) The share of the population in agriculture is deﬁned as the number of people
employed in agriculture, forestry and hunting, and ﬁshing in 1867 over the total
population in 1867 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 16b).
(v) The child dependency ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the population younger
than 15 years to the population between 15 and 65 years in 1864.
The source of the 1864 census data is K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin
(1861-1934, vol. 10).
1886 cross-section
We access landownership data from the occupation census in 1882 which classiﬁes
farms in 6 groups: farms with arable land up to 1 hectare, 1 to 2 ha, 2 to 10 ha, 10
35to 50 ha, 50 to 100 ha, and more than 100 ha. From this we construct landownership
concentration as the share of farms with more than 100 ha arable land (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 76c).
The education data is accessed from the 1886 census using information on public
primary schools (¨ Oﬀentliche Volksschulen). To calculate enrolment rates we divide
the number of attending students in 1886 by the number of children at mandatory
school age in 1886 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 101).
(i) The share of Protestants is deﬁned as the number of Protestants in 1880 divided
by the total population in 1880 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 66).
(ii) The share of urban population is deﬁned as the number of people living in cities
which held city rights in 1880 divided by the total population in 1880 (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 61).
(iii) The share of the population in the industrial sector is deﬁned as the number em-
ployed in mining and industry in 1882 over the total population in 1882 (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 76b).
(iv) The share of the population in agriculture is deﬁned as the number of people
employed in agriculture and animal husbandry in 1882 over the total population in
1882 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 76b).
(v) The child dependency ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the population younger than
19 years to the population between 19 and 70 years in 1882 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches
Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 76b).
(vi) The population density is deﬁned as the number of people per square kilometer
of land area in the county in 1882 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 76b).
(vii) The school density is deﬁned as the number of schools per square kilometer of
land area in the county in 1886 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 101).
The agricultural yields data were chosen to stem from the same years as the ed-
ucation data in 1886. They are deﬁned as the yields of winter wheat, winter rye,
summer barley, oats and potatoes per hectare (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in
Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 92).
1896 cross-section
We access landownership data from the occupation census in 1895 which classiﬁes
farms in 7 groups: farms with arable land up to 0.5 hectare, 0.5 to 2 ha, 2 to 5 ha,
365 to 20 ha, 20 to 100 ha, more than 100 ha, and more than 200 ha. From this we
construct landownership concentration as the share of farms with more than 100 ha
arable land (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 142b).
The education data is accessed from the 1896 census using information on public
primary schools (¨ Oﬀentliche Volksschulen). To calculate enrolment rates we divide
the number of attending students in 1896 by the number of children at mandatory
school age in 1896 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 151b).
(i) The share of Protestants is deﬁned as the number of Protestants in 1895 divided
by the total population in 1895 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 148a).
(ii) The share of urban population is deﬁned as the number of people living in cities
which held city rights in 1895 divided by the total population in 1895 (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 143).
(iii) The share of the population in the industrial sector is deﬁned as the number em-
ployed in mining and industry in 1895 over the total population in 1895 (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 142a).
(iv) The share of the population in agriculture is deﬁned as the number of people
employed in agriculture and animal husbandry in 1895 over the total population in
1895 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 142a).
(v) The child dependency ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the population younger than
19 years to the population between 19 and 70 years in 1895 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches
Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 143).
(vi) The population density is deﬁned as the number of people per square kilometer
of land area in the county in 1895 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 148a).
(vii) The school density is deﬁned as the number of schools per square kilometer of
land area in the county in 1896 (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-
1934, vol. 151b).
The agricultural yields data were chosen to stem from the same years as the ed-
ucation data in 1896. They are deﬁned as the yields of winter wheat, winter rye,
summer barley, oats and potatoes per hectare (K¨ onigliches Statistisches Bureau in
Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 147).
All cross-sections
Two control variables are common to all cross sections since data were unavailable
for any other point in time.
37(viii) The inheritance dummy is coded using county-level maps of historical inher-
itance laws from ca. 1900. The dummy takes the value one for counties that pre-
dominantly practiced partible inheritance (Naturalteilung) and takes the value zero
for counties that predominantly practiced non partible inheritance (Anerbenrecht)
(Sering, 1897-1905).
(ix) First language not German (1890) is deﬁned as the share of people whose
mother tongue is not German in 1890 over the total population in 1890 (K¨ onigliches
Statistisches Bureau in Berlin, 1861-1934, vol. 121a).
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38Figure 1: Schools per 100 children, 1816-96
Note: Number of schools per 100 children at school-age (6-14) at the district level.
Districts are ordered approximately from east to west, the gap roughly representing the river Elbe.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
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9Figure 2: Teachers per 100 children, 1816-96
Note: Number of teachers per 100 children at school-age (6-14) at the district level.
Districts are approximately ordered from east to west, the gap roughly representing the river Elbe.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
4
0Figure 3: Enrollment rates in 1849
Note: The enrollment rates are constructed as the number of pupils enrolled in primary and middle schools over the number of children aged 6-14.
Source: Own illustration; see main text for details.
4
1Figure 4: Concentration of landownership 1849
Note: The map shows the county structure of Prussia 1849.
The concentration of landownership, measured as the percentage of landowners with more than 300 PM, is roughly classied into quintiles.
Source: Own illustration; see main text for details.
4
2Figure 5: Our Instrument - Soil Texture
Note: The map shows the relative dominance of one of the three soil categories in total soil.
Source: Own illustration; see main text for details.
4
3Table 1: Total expenditure for public primary schools, 1861-86
1861 1864 1867 1871 1878 1886
Eastprussia 1.414 1.469 1.723 1.781 3.053 3.637
Westprussia 1.458 1.603 1.798 1.915 3.124 3.673
Poznan 1.190 1.253 1.399 1.695 2.687 3.508
Silesia 1.276 1.337 1.517 1.716 2.792 3.488
Pomerania 1.670 1.727 1.945 2.305 3.668 4.533
Brandenburg 1.963 1.953 2.109 2.468 3.515 4.220
Saxony 2.079 2.124 2.233 2.536 3.727 4.678
Westphalia 1.559 1.597 1.812 2.110 3.840 4.742
Rhineland 1.883 1.950 2.124 2.603 4.664 4.991
Note: Total expenditure for public primary schools in German Marks per capita at the province level.
Source: Own calculations according to K onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin (1889).
Table 2: State expenditures for public primary schools, 1861-86
1861 1864 1867 1871 1878 1886
Eastprussia 0.079 0.077 0.095 0.142 0.636 0.742
Westprussia 0.103 0.096 0.111 0.169 0.499 0.667
Poznan 0.085 0.080 0.103 0.141 0.638 0.798
Silesia 0.035 0.038 0.050 0.074 0.325 0.424
Pomerania 0.063 0.052 0.060 0.119 0.807 0.908
Brandenburg 0.111 0.083 0.106 0.129 0.461 0.501
Saxony 0.090 0.068 0.079 0.109 0.356 0.378
Westphalia 0.058 0.044 0.069 0.096 0.392 0.376
Rhineland 0.039 0.041 0.058 0.087 0.397 0.410
Note: State expenditures for public primary schools in German Marks per capita at the province level.
Source: Own calculations according to K onigliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin (1889).
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4Table 3: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1816 1849 1864 1886 1896
Enrollment rate (6-14) 0.603 0.802 0.753 0.935 0.944
(0.195) (0.117) (0.104) (0.061) (0.057)
Large landholdings (share) 0.017 0.024 0.025 0.009 0.008
(0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.009) (0.007)
Gini coecient 0.646 0.704 0.733 0.742 0.756
(0.120) (0.114) (0.091) (0.117) (0.113)
Gini coecient (adjusted) 0.868 0.867 0.884 0.872 0.878
(0.073) (0.122) (0.108) (0.088) (0.082)
Protestant (share) 0.616 0.605 0.600 0.597 0.595
(0.402) (0.394) (0.391) (0.386) (0.382)
Urban (share) 0.244 0.246 0.260 0.285 0.305
(0.182) (0.186) (0.194) (0.202) (0.207)
Industrial (share) 0.009 0.072 0.080 0.116 0.123
(0.023) (0.039) (0.048) (0.058) (0.059)
Agricultural (share) 0.088 0.433 0.186 0.203 0.195
(0.038) (0.174) (0.066) (0.073) (0.076)
Child dependency ratio 0.631 0.646 0.602 0.903 0.782
(0.074) (0.077) (0.067) (0.111) (0.100)
Population density 0.760 1.774 2.236 2.931 3.228
(1.855) (8.430) (11.238) (15.633) (16.600)
School density 0.131 0.177 0.195 0.146 0.150
(0.263) (0.730) (0.756) (0.276) (0.231)
Inheritance (dummy) 0.246 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245
(0.432) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431) (0.431)
First language not German (1890) 0.109 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132
(0.223) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249)
Observations 272 335 335 335 335
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
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5Table 4: Landownership concentration and enrollment rates (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep Var: Enrollment rates 1816 1849 1864 1886 1896
Large landholdings (share) -3.195*** -1.329*** -1.181*** -0.616* -0.708*
(0.507) (0.253) (0.190) (0.328) (0.409)
Protestant (share) 0.172*** 0.049*** 0.040*** -0.004 0.007
(0.031) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
Urban (share) -0.068 -0.092** 0.047 -0.116*** -0.099***
(0.063) (0.039) (0.056) (0.022) (0.020)
Industrial (share) -0.478** 0.062 0.322 0.619*** 0.609***
(0.233) (0.142) (0.203) (0.111) (0.081)
Agricultural (share) 0.207 -0.067 0.312* 0.589*** 0.550***
(0.265) (0.044) (0.167) (0.103) (0.066)
Child dependency ratio -0.300** -0.038 -0.180** 0.188*** 0.230***
(0.132) (0.083) (0.090) (0.031) (0.028)
Population density -0.064*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
School density 0.407*** 0.087*** 0.046*** 0.116*** 0.184***
(0.087) (0.015) (0.010) (0.034) (0.052)
Inheritance (dummy) -0.009 0.019 0.029** -0.002 -0.008
(0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
First language not German (1890) -0.271*** -0.163*** -0.140*** -0.057*** -0.010
(0.059) (0.030) (0.025) (0.012) (0.009)
Constant 0.769*** 0.892*** 0.782*** 0.611*** 0.597***
(0.099) (0.063) (0.089) (0.060) (0.042)
Observations 272 335 335 335 335
R-squared 0.49 0.38 0.40 0.58 0.63
Note: OLS estimates at the county level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
4
6Table 5: Instrumenting landownership concentration with soil texture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1816 1849 1864 1886 1896
First stage Dep Var: Landownership concentration
PCA component 1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
PCA component 2 0.004** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Second stage Dep Var: Enrollment rates
Large landholdings (share) -8.858*** -3.683*** -2.281** -1.943* -1.478
(2.183) (1.129) (1.037) (1.054) (1.165)
Protestant (share) 0.251*** 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.003 0.012
(0.043) (0.021) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Urban (share) 0.045 -0.050 0.092 -0.111*** -0.094***
(0.119) (0.048) (0.076) (0.023) (0.022)
Industrial (share) -1.222** -0.395 0.257 0.521*** 0.572***
(0.475) (0.263) (0.213) (0.122) (0.096)
Agricultural (share) 0.584* -0.014 0.505** 0.582*** 0.559***
(0.299) (0.051) (0.237) (0.103) (0.068)
Child dependency ratio -0.091 0.100 -0.034 0.201*** 0.235***
(0.167) (0.128) (0.160) (0.033) (0.030)
Population density -0.084*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002***
(0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
School density 0.524*** 0.096*** 0.040*** 0.112*** 0.187***
(0.123) (0.017) (0.014) (0.035) (0.054)
Inheritance (dummy) -0.050 -0.013 0.022* -0.009 -0.012
(0.031) (0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
First language not German (1890) -0.184*** -0.153*** -0.144*** -0.054*** -0.008
(0.065) (0.032) (0.026) (0.012) (0.009)
Constant 0.629*** 0.848*** 0.675*** 0.619*** 0.598***
(0.122) (0.078) (0.129) (0.060) (0.042)
Observations 272 335 335 335 335
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 8.236 10.37 9.521 14.92 13.69
Note: IV estimates instrumenting landownership concentration with soil texture. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
4
7Table 6: Robustness check { Agricultural productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1816 1849 1864 1886 1896
First stage Dep Var: Landownership concentration
PCA component 1 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
PCA component 2 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Second stage Dep Var: Enrollment rates
Large landholdings (share) -9.016*** -3.308*** -2.357** -1.166 -0.442
(2.515) (1.118) (0.976) (0.948) (1.068)
Wheat yield per hectare 0.014 0.008** 0.007** 0.000 0.003**
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Rye yield per hectare -0.010 -0.015** -0.010*** -0.000 -0.004**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Barley yield per hectare 0.015* 0.005 0.001 -0.004** -0.002
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Oat yield per hectare -0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Potato yield per hectare 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 269 329 329 329 327
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 6.357 9.611 9.321 15.33 13.47
Note: IV estimates instrumenting landownership concentration with soil texture. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted. Additional controls: %
protestant, % urban, % industrial, % agricultural, child dependency ratio, population density, school density, inheritance, rst language not German (1890). In columns 1-4
yields refer to 1886; in column 5 yields refer to 1896. Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
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8Table 7: Instrumenting landownership concentration with soil texture (excluding city counties)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1816 1849 1864 1886 1896 1849 rural
First stage Dep Var: Landownership concentration
PCA component 1 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
PCA component 2 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Second stage Dep Var: Enrollment rates
Large landholdings (share) -7.652*** -3.644*** -2.422** -1.441 -1.005
(1.841) (1.155) (0.984) (0.886) (0.921)
Large landholdings (share in rural) -2.642***
(0.844)
Protestant (share) 0.195*** 0.055** 0.029** 0.002 0.009 0.048**
(0.043) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021)
Urban (share) 0.105 0.029 0.173** -0.113*** -0.090*** 0.076
(0.101) (0.063) (0.074) (0.025) (0.020) (0.069)
Industrial (share) -1.036** -0.300 0.708*** 0.464*** 0.499*** -0.206
(0.512) (0.229) (0.133) (0.120) (0.092) (0.204)
Agricultural (share) 0.684** -0.073 0.434** 0.540*** 0.459*** -0.090*
(0.275) (0.050) (0.219) (0.107) (0.060) (0.050)
Child dependency ratio -0.073 0.104 0.014 0.171*** 0.206*** 0.103
(0.153) (0.123) (0.161) (0.032) (0.027) (0.117)
Population density -0.184*** -0.109*** -0.082*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.116***
(0.050) (0.027) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.027)
School density 1.453*** 0.757*** 0.181 0.144 0.161* 0.784***
(0.374) (0.251) (0.135) (0.122) (0.098) (0.233)
Inheritance (dummy) -0.049* -0.017 0.026** -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
(0.030) (0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017)
First language not German (1890) -0.163** -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.052*** -0.011 -0.151***
(0.067) (0.031) (0.025) (0.013) (0.009) (0.030)
Constant 0.568*** 0.863*** 0.668*** 0.652*** 0.651*** 0.847***
(0.119) (0.071) (0.120) (0.058) (0.039) (0.069)
Observations 267 325 325 324 324 325
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 11.51 10.48 9.658 15.39 17.56 11.40
Note: IV estimates instrumenting landownership concentration with soil texture.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
4
9Table 8: Gini coecient and enrollment rates (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep Var: Enrollment rates 1816 1849 1864 1886 1896
Gini coecient -0.074 -0.026 0.042 0.003 0.039
(0.110) (0.064) (0.070) (0.033) (0.030)
Observations 272 335 335 335 335
R-squared 0.40 0.32 0.35 0.58 0.63
Gini coecient (adjusted) -0.500** -0.154** -0.077 -0.050 0.003
(0.206) (0.065) (0.068) (0.034) (0.033)
Observations 272 335 335 335 335
R-squared 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.58 0.63
Note: OLS estimates at the county level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The adjusted Gini accounts for propertyless farm workers, see text.
Constant omitted. Additional controls: % protestant, % urban, % industrial, % agricultural, child dependency ratio, population density, school density, inheritance, rst
language not German (1890). Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
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0Table 9: Panel analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Enrollment rates Pooled FE TFE Pooled FE TFE
Large landholdings (share) -2.618*** -2.163*** -1.038**
(0.262) (0.476) (0.455)
Gini coecient (adjusted) -0.249*** -0.131** -0.167***
(0.034) (0.055) (0.058)
Protestant (share) 0.100*** 0.578** 0.505** 0.090*** 0.523** 0.486**
(0.009) (0.234) (0.199) (0.010) (0.235) (0.200)
Urban (share) -0.099*** 0.004 0.019 -0.088*** 0.025 0.025
(0.026) (0.067) (0.065) (0.025) (0.064) (0.063)
Industrial (share) 1.184*** 1.310*** -0.351** 1.408*** 1.334*** -0.401**
(0.074) (0.108) (0.159) (0.074) (0.106) (0.161)
Agricultural (share) 0.361*** 0.302*** 0.003 0.271*** 0.256*** -0.040
(0.030) (0.024) (0.042) (0.030) (0.024) (0.042)
Child dependency ratio 0.307*** 0.401*** 0.254*** 0.333*** 0.479*** 0.271***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.073) (0.020) (0.033) (0.074)
Population density -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
School density 0.029*** 0.026** 0.023* 0.020** 0.021 0.016
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
Time dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387
R-squared 0.52 0.59 0.70 0.48 0.58 0.70
Number of counties 280 280 280 280 280 280
Note: Panel estimates: FE indicates county xed eects, TFE adds time xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The adjusted Gini accounts for propertyless
farm workers, see text. 13 observations drop out from the analysis because of missing information in the 1816 data. Signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: See Appendix A.2 for data sources and details.
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